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Abstract
Stojnic´ et al. (Philos Perspect 27(1):502–525, 2013; Linguist Philos 40(5):519–547,
2017) argue that the reference of demonstratives is fixed without any contribution from
the extra-linguistic context. On their ‘prominence/coherence’ theory, the reference of a
demonstrative expression depends only on its context-independent linguistic meaning.
Here, we argue that Stojnic´ et al.’s striking claims can be maintained in only the thinnest
technical sense. Instead of eliminating appeals to the extra-linguistic context, we show
how the prominence/coherence theory merely suppresses them. Then we ask why one
might be tempted to try and offer such a view. Since we are rather sympathetic to the
motivations we find, we close by sketching a more plausible alternative.
Keywords Reference · Metasemantics · Demonstratives · Pronouns
1 Introduction
If you point at the V-notch couloir on the North Palisade and utter (1), most people
will take you to have said something false.1 If you point at the U-notch couloir instead,
while uttering the same sentence, people will take you to have said something true:
(1) That is the U-notch couloir.
1 Nathaniel Hansen reports the intuition: ‘What the **** is a V-notch couloir?’ We are confident that the
arguments we offer here are consistent with this response. By way of information, a couloir is a steep and
narrow channel on the side of a mountain, typically filled with ice and snow. The V-notch is a couloir on
the North Palisade in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California that looks like the letter ‘v’.
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Linguists and philosophers generally agree that the two utterances should be associated
with different truth conditions, which result from differences in the extra-linguistic
contexts in which the two utterances take place. Some think that the speaker’s ges-
ture determines which object the demonstrative picks out. Some think her referential
intentions are what does this work. Some approaches weigh these two things against
one another, and others invoke further considerations still.
In the Golden Age of philosophical work on demonstratives, debates between the-
orists advocating one or another of these positions were treated as semantic debates.2
It was generally assumed that an adequate compositional semantic theory would take
a demonstrative sentence and a context and return a determinate truth condition. More
recently, philosophers have been attracted to analyses on which, semantically speak-
ing, demonstratives are represented simply as variables. On this way of thinking, the
classic disputes turn out to be disputes about which principles should be used to link
contexts to particular variable assignments.3
Stojnic´ et al. (2013, 2017) have recently attracted significant attention by reject-
ing the framework of the classic debates entirely. According to what they call the
‘prominence/coherence’ theory of demonstratives, the question of which feature of a
context fixes the referent of a demonstrative is fundamentally confused. On their view,
the context-independent linguistic meaning of ‘that’ fixes its reference without any
contribution from speaker intentions, demonstrations, or other features of the speech
situation in which the expression is used.
Our primary aim here is to show that Stojnic´ et al.’s striking claim can be sustained
only in the thinnest technical sense. We will argue that instead of eliminating appeals
to extra-linguistic context, the prominence/coherence theory simply relocates them.
This relocation, in our view, fails to resolve any of the thorny questions that arise
regarding the way in which the extra-linguistic context helps to determine the intuitive
truth conditions of a particular use of a demonstrative sentence. Properly understood,
Stojnic´ et al.’s proposal raises exactly the same issues—and is susceptible to exactly
the same sorts of challenges—as every other extant theory of demonstratives of which
we are aware.
Having established this negative thesis, we turn our attention to a discussion of its
significance. We structure that discussion around two connected questions. First, why
might one be tempted to offer a picture along the lines of Stojnic´ et al.’s? And second, if
we are right that the authors fail to deliver the theoretical goods promised, might there
be some other way of obtaining them? To preview: we suspect that Stojnic´ et al. are
eager to avoid invoking the extra-linguistic context because they worry that fractious
debates about which variable assignment should count as ‘the one true assignment’ in
a context lead nowhere.4 We share this concern; what once appeared to be a healthy
ecosystem of competing views has, in certain regards, begun to look like a degenerative
2 Artifacts from this Golden Age include Kaplan (1977, 1978, 1989), Bertolet (1980), McGinn (1981),
Schiffer (1981), Wettstein (1984), Reimer (1991, 1992), and Bach (1992).
3 For discussion, compare Rabern (2012a, b), Yalcin (2014), and Nowak (2016, forthcoming).
4 For a representative sample, see Neale (2004), Gauker (2008), Mount (2008), King (2013, 2014a, b), and
Speaks (2016, 2017).
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research program.5 To really move away from the old picture, however, we suspect
that something more radical than Stojnic´ et al.’s suggestions might be required. One
response, which we take to have at least some appeal, would be to give up the idea
that demonstrative sentences in a context really have canonical truth conditions in the
first place.
2 The prominence/coherence theory
Here is the thesis that we want to dispute:
The semantic value of a pronoun is never determined, even partly, by extra-
linguistic cues; it is fixed, invariably and unambiguously, by features of its context
of use governed entirely by linguistic rules. (Stojnic´ et al. 2017, p. 519)
Except for the part about extra-linguistic cues, this thesis sounds perfectly conso-
nant with longstanding philosophical tradition. Most theorists endorse one or another
variation on the following template, according to which the semantic value of a demon-
strative is fixed invariably and unambiguously by some specific feature (or specific
combination of features) of its context of use:6
(2) thatc,w = the object ostended/intended/etc. by the speaker of c
For their part, Stojnic´ et al. claim that the semantic value of a demonstrative in a context
is the object that is at the center of attention in the context. They do not think their
positive proposal amounts to just another way of filling out the standard template from
(2), however. By ‘center of attention’, they do not mean something determined by any
actual or hypothetical person’s psychological state, and by ‘context of use’, they do
not mean a representation of the concrete speech situation in which a demonstrative
is or might be tokened (Stojnic´ et al. 2017, pp. 524–526). It is worth pausing here to
elaborate on these potentially-confusing claims.
Stojnic´ et al. frame their view using dynamic semantic machinery on which contexts
are simply sequences of objects. In their terms, the object that occupies the first position
in a sequence is said to be the most prominent, or to be at the center of attention. Their
key claim is that the object that occupies that position is determined by linguistic rules
which require no supplementation from the speech situation.
Some of those rules, which are characterized in terms of functions from contexts
into contexts, have recognizable analogues in existing work on dynamic semantics.
The rule Stojnic´ et al. associate with the existential quantifier, for example, takes an
arbitrary input context and returns a variation on which the order of the objects is
preserved, but on which they are all shifted down one place in the sequence to allow
the introduction of a new object in the first position. This means that demonstrative
expressions that occur after an indefinite will refer to it anaphorically, assuming nothing
else intervenes. Witness:
5 Compare Lakatos (1974).
6 Read (2): the extension of ‘that’ with regard to any context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation
is the object ostended by the speaker of the context. Compare semantic theories from Kaplan (1977, 1978),
Reimer (1991, 1992), Bach (1992), Salmon (2002), and Caplan (2003).
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(3) A man walked in. He sat down.
Stojnic´ et al. model this discourse by means of the following series of updates, where
‘α’ represents the existential quantifier and ‘@’ a pronominal element that picks out
the first object in the sequence with regard to which it is evaluated:7
(4) 〈α0〉; [man(@)]; [walk.in(@)]; [si t .down(@)]
The operation associated with the existential quantifier takes an input context and adds
an unspecified new object to the first (the 0-th) position, moving all the other objects
down one spot (Stojnic´ et al. 2017, p. 527).8 The remaining updates specify conditions
on the new object. Analyzed as per (4), sentence (3) is true with respect to a model
and an input context just in case there is some object in the model that is a man who
walked in and sat down. Intuitively, that is the right result.
Most of the update operations that Stojnic´ et al. define implement coherence rela-
tions of the sort described by Kehler (2002), and are used to provide an account of the
resolution of pronominal anaphora. Instead of relying on speakers’ and interpreters’
general pragmatic competence, Stojnic´ et al. claim that coherence relations encoded
in the grammar modify prominence relations, which in turn provide referents for pro-
nouns. While this is an intriguing idea, we will focus here primarily on those instances
where—even according to Stojnic´ et al.—coherence relations play a fairly minimal
role. This will simplify the dialectic to follow.9
For now, we want to focus on a pair of operations that have a specific role to play in
the interpretation of deictic uses of demonstratives. Both of those operations import
objects into the linguistic context from the extra-linguistic context.10 One of them, π ,
is used when a demonstrative occurs together with a pointing gesture. The other, σ , is
used in cases where a demonstrative is tokened without an accompanying gesture.
Consider (1) again:
(1) That is the U-notch couloir.
Intuitively, this sentence should be true in a context in which the speaker is pointing at
the U-notch couloir. Stojnic´ et al. derive that result by offering the following analysis:11
(5) 〈π0U-notch〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
7 For present purposes, no harm will come from ignoring differences between the sets of features (e.g.
number, grammatical gender, person) that characterize various pronouns and demonstrative elements. We
have no wish to contest that Stojnic´ et al.’s system is capable of handling these.
8 We must confess that we are unsure what exactly an ‘unspecified new object’ amounts to here. Perhaps
this is just shorthand for a set of instructions, i.e. ‘select an arbitrary object from the model’. If not, we
worry that this sounds a great deal like Russell (1903)’s claim that the indefinite description ‘a man’ denotes
an ambiguous man—a claim which has proved notoriously difficult to make sense of, and which Russell
himself subsequently abandoned for just these reasons.
9 We take up the role played by coherence relations in §3.2, as they are helpful for understanding how
Stojnic´ et al. (2017) think about demonstratives unaccompanied by pointing gestures.
10 The operations in question, that is, import objects from the context, construed after the fashion of Kaplan
(1977), into the context, construed à la Heim (1982).
11 Where ‘U-notch’ is a meta-language name for the U-notch couloir. Read (5) as an instruction to first put
the object designated by ‘U-notch’ into the 0-slot of the input context, whatever it may be, and then to test
the result against the condition that the top object be the U-notch couloir.
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When a demonstrative is uttered together with a pointing gesture, Stojnic´ et al. say
that the gesture contributes a π -update to the LF associated with the demonstrative
sentence (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, p. 516). Like the update associated with the existential
quantifier, π -updates modify the input context by adding a new object to the top slot.
Unlike the existential update, however, π -updates involve a determinate object—the
object ostended by the person uttering the demonstrative.12
If we use (5) to analyze (1), we make the correct prediction about the intuitive truth
value of the sentence in the situation described.13 The π -update modifies the input
context so that the U-notch couloir is the first object in the sequence; every other object
moves down one position. The demonstrative element, @, picks out the top object in
the context, which is then checked against the condition of being the U-notch couloir.
We end up with the result that (1) is true with regard to a model and an input context
just in case the U-notch couloir is in the domain of the model and is identical with the
U-notch couloir.14
The same basic strategy is used to explain the intuitive data in cases that do not
involve gestures. If we are standing on the Palisade Glacier, looking southwest towards
a prominent channel of snow and ice that breaks up a rock face,15 you might use (1)
to say something true without pointing at anything. According to Stojnic´ et al., the LF
associated with (1) in such a case would be:
(6) 〈σ0s0〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
Whereas the π operation involved an individual constant, the σ operation features
a term denoting a situation, in the sense of Barwise and Perry (1983) and Kratzer
(2002).16 Stojnic´ et al. do not address the question of how this situation is determined
in great detail, but their discussion of examples suggests that it will typically be a part
of the situation in which the speech act occurs. A σ operation has the effect of taking
the central individual, the central location, and the central event from the relevant
12 Actually, Stojnic´ et al.’s proposed operator is more flexible than this, being able to push objects to
other slots in the sequence as well. 〈π1U-notch〉, for instance, would push U-notch to the second slot in
the sequence, the 1-slot. We elide this additional complexity, however, as it is used to deal with sentences
involving multiple pronominal elements and we will consider no such sentences below.
13 We would note, however, that (5) is true in all possible worlds; in other words, it is necessary. This derives
from the fact that being a U-notch couloir is an essential property of the referent of the meta-language name
U-notch, given that we have stipulated the referent of that name. It strikes us as highly implausible that any
utterance of (1) will be necessary. After all, in some nearby possible worlds, the couloir will, due to slightly
different patterns of erosion, resemble a ‘v’ more than a ‘u’.
14 We leave it to the reader to set up the case in which (1) is uttered by someone pointing not at the U-notch,
but at the V-notch or at something else entirely.
15 Michaelson (2013) points out that directed glances might, in fact, be considered a sort of gesture. If
you are inclined to agree, you should analyze this example using a π update instead of σ , and reframe the
example using an object that could be picked out by way of a demonstrative in the absence of any obvious
gazing, like a loud noise, a smell, or a tremor.
16 Hat tip to Locke (1689) for providing the substrate of minimal situations that today’s theoretical edifice
adheres to.
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situation and putting them into the top three spots of the context, pushing all other
objects down accordingly (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, p. 516).17
In the case where we are standing on a glacier and you speak without pointing, they
will say that the central object of the situation in question is the U-notch couloir. So,
the input context is modified in such a fashion that the new top object is the U-notch
couloir. When the demonstrative element is interpreted, then, it picks out the U-notch,
which of course satisfies the condition of being the U-notch.
3 Old problems in a new guise
We accept that there is a perfectly clear sense in which the semantic value of a demon-
strative, on Stojnic´ et al.’s account, does not depend on the extra-linguistic context in
which it is uttered. We submit, however, that there is just as clear a sense in which
the extra-linguistic context plays as significant a role for them as it does for everyone
else. While there may well be genuine work for their machinery to do—this seems
especially likely where the treatment of anaphora is concerned—it is important to rec-
ognize that by itself, that machinery does nothing to address the fundamental questions
raised by the basic demonstrative data.
At the end of the day, what we expect from a theory of demonstratives is an answer
to the question of why two different truth conditions should be associated with a
demonstrative sentence when it is uttered on two occasions by someone pointing at two
different objects. Historically, this was usually been taken to be a semantic question;
demonstratives were assumed to be semantically sensitive to context, and the challenge
was to identify the particular contextual feature or features they track. More recently,
the idea that the question is a post-semantic one has gained traction; demonstratives are
treated as variables in the compositional semantics, and the challenge of the intuitive
data is to identify the principles that link a context of utterance to a particular variable
assignment. If Stojnic´ et al. are right about the semantics (‘that’ picks out the top
object in a context) and metasemantics (the top object is determined by π /σ -updates)
of demonstratives, the intuitive challenge might manifest in yet another guise, but it
does not simply dissipate. Now we must ask: in virtue of what should we associate a
particular π /σ -update with a particular speech situation? We see no way of answering
that question without invoking details of the extra-linguistic context.
3.1 Deixis by pointing
As we have just seen, analyzing (1) as per (5) gets us the expected truth conditions for
cases where the speaker is pointing at the U-notch:
(1) That is the U-notch couloir.
(5) 〈π0U-notch〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
17 Again, we are eliding some of the complexities of Stojnic´ et al.’s system here. In its fullest framing,
their system also includes more complex pronominal elements than ‘@’, elements which are, for instance
capable of accessing the 1-slot or 2-slot. This proves useful in modeling the behavior of demonstratives
like ‘there’ or ‘then’, which are used to refer to places or times rather than the individuals which typically
inhabit the 0-slot (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, p. 518). Effectively, ‘@’ abbreviates ‘@that’.
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As Stojnic´ et al. emphasize, (5) has a perfectly determinate meaning that is constant
across both concrete speech situations and also across contexts, taken in the authors’
technical sense. We fail to see, however, how this fact makes (1) interestingly insen-
sitive to context, understood in the more traditional, Kaplanian sense. If we accept
Stojnic´ et al.’s proposal, the challenge of explaining the intuitive data takes the form
of the following question: why should we analyze (1) along the lines of (5)? Why
should we not understand (1) as involving some other possible π -update instead—for
instance, 〈π0V-notch〉, or an update that puts something else altogether into the top
spot of the sequence?
At this point, the available answers start to look like all the old familiar ones. We
might say that (5) is the right representation because the speaker intended to refer to
the U-notch. Or we could say that it is because the speaker’s gesture was directed at
the U-notch. Or we could blend these two responses together, or say something more
sophisticated still.
As far as we can tell, however, any non-deflationary response to this question is
going to involve an appeal to elements of the extra-linguistic context. Even if one
refuses to provide any details, saying only that ‘Context determines which π -update
is involved here,’ we see no way to avoid the conclusion that it is the extra-linguistic
context that does the work. Where (1) appears discourse initially, there is simply
no linguistic context to appeal to. And even when (1) appears within an extended
discourse, one of the interesting things about deictic uses of demonstratives is that
they can shift the linguistic context by introducing new discourse referents drawn
from the extra-linguistic context.
Stojnic´ et al.’s discussion makes clear that they think gestures bear significant
explanatory weight in cases like these. They offer plausible reasons—like intralinguis-
tic stability and interlinguistic variability—for treating gestures as full-blown linguistic
expressions (2017, pp. 528–529). Remarkably, however, the treatment they offer for
the semantics of gestures does not invoke the extra-linguistic context; gestures, on
their view, are semantically complete expressions like proper names, which pick out
a particular referent regardless of which context they are used in.
The basic thought here is that two physically indiscernible acts of pointing can
count as different gestures. So, one gesture might be a pointing at Bill, while another,
involving what appear to be exactly the same bodily motions, might be a pointing
at Bill’s shirt. According to Stojnic´ et al., it is a pre-semantic matter, a matter of
disambiguation, to determine which gesture some ambiguous physical motion is in
fact an instance of (2017, p. 530).
We have no wish to quarrel with this way of individuating gestures. It is worth not-
ing, however, that there is a fairly well-developed alternative: a theorist might agree
with Stojnic´ et al. that gestures deserve to be counted as full-blown linguistic expres-
sions, but disagree about a gesture’s contributing a determinate object independent of
context. Kaplan (1977) himself took gestures to be underdetermined expressions that
denote ranges of possible referents rather than any specific individual or property. In
fact, one of the co-authors of both Stojnic´ et al. (2013, 2017) previously argued for
just this sort of picture (specifically, in Lascarides and Stone 2009). So, we find it
curious that no argument is offered for the much stronger metaphysics of gestures that
Stojnic´ et al. now endorse. These metaphysical-semantic assumptions are crucial to
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the smooth running of the semantic machinery the authors rely on, yet they go entirely
unsupported.
While we are ourselves inclined to follow Kaplan in thinking of gestures more like
definite descriptions than proper names, for the sake of argument let us simply accept
Stojnic´ et al.’s treatment. On their picture, there is no question of why a pointing at
Bill has Bill as its target; that is simply part of what it is to be a pointing at Bill.
Instead, the relevant question becomes: what makes it the case that such-and-such a
bodily motion (something that can be common between two gestures, on this way
of individuating things) counts, in the relevant context, as a pointing at x? In other
words, what specifically makes this particular bodily motion into a gesture? As far
as we can tell, any reasonable answer to this question is going to have to appeal to
extra-linguistic context.
Consider a context in which the speaker has uttered (1) while pointing in such
a way that—holding fixed her location, surroundings, and the physical form of her
gesture—it is metaphysically possible for her pointing to instantiate either a pointing
at the V-notch couloir, a pointing at the U-notch couloir, or a pointing at the unnamed
couloir to the looker’s right of the U-notch at 13,658’. Now we are faced with three
different interpretive options for the logical form of the speaker’s utterance of (1):
(5) 〈π0U-notch〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
(7) 〈π0V-notch〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
(8) 〈π0couloir at 13,658’〉; [is.the.U .notch.couloir(@)]
We take it that the natural thing to say here is that the speaker’s referential intentions
determine one from among the candidates as the proper disambiguation of (1).18 That
line is blocked for Stojnic´ et al., however, since it would entail that the extra-linguistic
context plays a meaning-determining role with respect to (1). Similarly, Stojnic´ et al.
cannot appeal to either salience or to all-things-considered judgments rendered on the
basis of various aspects of the extra-linguistic context.19
In fact, things are even worse than this. As we have presented the example, the
three possible interpretive options were that the speaker’s gesture targets the U-notch
couloir, the V-notch couloir, or the unnamed couloir to ‘the looker’s right’ of the U-
notch at 13,658’. The idea that the speaker’s gesture might target, say, Barack Obama,
was not considered. But why? The natural explanation would seem to run: Barack
Obama is not present in the extra-linguistic context, and thus cannot be targeted by
the speaker’s gesture. One cannot gesture at what is not there.20
18 Compare Kaplan (1978), Reimer (1991, 1992), and Michaelson (2013).
19 See Mount (2008) for the former and Wettstein (1984) and Gauker (2008) for the latter.
20 One might attempt to challenge this claim on the basis of so-called deferred reference, such as the
pointing at a picture of Carnap, saying ‘he’, and purportedly referring to Carnap himself. We are unsure
whether to treat such reference as a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon (cf. Nunberg 1995). Regardless, our
principle can be weakened to say something like: one cannot gesture at what is neither there nor represented,
in context, by something which is there. This weakened principle should suffice for our purposes, as would
any number of yet weaker alternatives; although Carnap is represented by the picture of him, no feature of
the scene from the Palisade Glacier can plausibly be treated as a representation of Obama.
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Stojnic´ et al. cannot endorse such an explanation, however. The presence or absence
of an object is a fact about extra-linguistic context, and, according to their theory, extra-
linguistic context plays no role at all in determining the meaning of a demonstrative.
So, according to Stojnic´ et al., extra-linguistic context cannot constrain the possible
interpretations of the physical form of a gesture—for that would be to allow that
extra-linguistic context partially determines the meaning of a demonstrative.
We cannot discern any direct response to this problem of disambiguation in Sto-
jnic´ et al.’s work. In their most detailed discussion of the issue, they compare the
kind of disambiguation that demonstratives require, on their view, with the kind of
disambiguation required in cases of lexical ambiguity:
For instance, if you say ‘I am at the bank’ while standing at the riverbank, this
very fact might serve as a cue towards disambiguating one way; if you say ‘I
put some money in the bank’, the plausibility of one content over another might
serve as a cue that prompts a different interpretation. (Stojnic´ et al. 2017, note
23, p. 529)
We find this analogy puzzling. We expect that most linguists and philosophers will
say that cases involving lexical ambiguity are cases in which the phonological form
of a sentence underdetermines its logical form. In this regard, there is a clear parallel
with Stojnic´ et al.’s proposal. Where lexical ambiguity is concerned, however, we
imagine that everyone who thinks that there are facts of the matter about which LF is
expressed by a sentence on an occasion will agree that those facts are determined by
some concrete features of the speech situation, like facts about the speaker’s intentions,
or facts about what a reasonable hearer would take the speaker to have meant. We take
lexical ambiguity, then, to show that constituents that are not themselves semantically
sensitive to context can nevertheless be implicated in the production of contextual
effects at a higher level of description.21
Even on Stojnic´ et al.’s description, extra-linguistic context plays a key role in
distinguishing between the possible LFs that could be associated with a sentence
formed from an ambiguous expression. It is the fact that the speaker is standing
at a riverbank, in their example, that favors one interpretation of ‘bank’ over the
other. How should we reconcile this with their hostility to the idea that context
plays a meaning-determining role? One strategy might be to take the authors to be
endorsing a view that posits a gap between the resources available to help inter-
21 Stojnic´ et al. continue: ‘[W]hile we recognize that disambiguation can exploit a broad range of epistemic
cues, we point out that, in the usual case, it exploits a set of precompiled solutions that obviate the need for
open-ended reasoning about the speakers’ mental states, that would require the interlocutors to construct a
broad range of potential interpretations on the fly. In most cases, the cues single out the correct interpretation
from a set of possible ones the speakers know in advance’ (2017, note 23, p. 529). But this seems merely
to change the subject from the question of what, metaphysically, serves to disambiguate a sentence like
(1) to the question of how listeners typically recover that disambiguation. Metaphysics has no need for
precompiled solutions; it deals in facts, not reasoning. On the other hand, listeners, trying to identify what
the speaker is talking about, might well make use of such solutions. Perhaps what Stojnic´ et al. mean is
that there is a metaphysical correlate of these ‘solutions’. But it seems to us that such correlates will need
to appeal to extra-linguistic context if they are to identify objects and properties present in those contexts
as referents. So, once more, the suggestion fails to deliver what has been advertised.
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preters in arriving at referential hypotheses and the resources that in fact determine
reference.22
There is clearly logical space open for a kind of error theory along these lines, on
which interpreters use context to help them form hypotheses about what ambiguous
sentences mean, despite the fact that in the background, as it were, the real meanings
are fixed without any contextual input. We think such a view would be prima facie
unattractive, however, as it threatens to make meanings epiphenomenal. In other words,
on this sort of theory, the meanings of sentences like (1) might turn out to be completely
detached from what speakers can expect to succeed in conveying by means of them.
In fact, the meanings of such sentences could turn out to be something that one will
never be able to convey by means of an utterance of that sentence. This strikes us
as worrisome. Although we do not intend to defend a particular claim about which
features of a context determine the reference of a demonstrative (indeed, we have
doubts about whether there can be a single correct theory in this connection), and
although we take it that both speakers and listeners are surely capable of being mistaken
about what an ambiguous sentence means in a context, we would hesitate to endorse a
theory that allows that meaning in a context can systematically come apart from what
sentences are typically used to communicate in similar contexts.
Even leaving aside these worries, however, positing a systematic gap between the
referents of demonstrative expressions and the objects people take to be the referents
does nothing to advance us towards an actual theory of disambiguation—something
that we still stand in need of if we are to fully assess the viability of Stojnic´ et al.’s
proposed semantics and metasemantics for demonstratives. Effectively, by treating
gestures as determinate linguistic items, Stojnic´ et al. have introduced a new and
highly ambiguous item into the lexicon. That, in turn, makes the need for a theory of
disambiguation all the more pressing for them, particularly if we are supposed to be
able to evaluate their proposal in part on the basis of the predictions it makes.
In short, then, we take Stojnic´ et al.’s semantics and metasemantics for sentences like
(1), sentences containing a demonstrative and accompanied by a pointing gesture, to
turn the question ‘What determines the reference of a demonstrative (accompanied by a
pointing gesture)?’ into the question ‘What determines the target of the accompanying
gesture?’ We have argued that all of the natural answers somewhere appeal to extra-
linguistic context. Since Stojnic´ et al. fail to provide an alternative, we conclude
that instead of offering a theory on which the reference of demonstratives is fixed
independently of the extra-linguistic context, what they have offered is more accurately
conceived of as a theory on which any explicit mention of extra-linguistic context has
simply been suppressed.
22 We think the idea that such a gap looms in at least some cases is unobjectionable. That differences
can arise between what an interpreter takes to have been expressed and what was actually expressed is
presumably what allows us to intentionally mislead people; I know that you will think I meant φ, because I
know about your epistemic state, but in fact I stated ψ . For the record, an earlier time-slice of Ernie Lepore,
i.e. the co-author of Fodor and Lepore (2004), agrees with us about this.
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3.2 Deixis without pointing
Stojnic´ et al.’s approach to cases in which the use of a demonstrative goes unaccompa-
nied by any pointing gesture raises essentially the same worries as those which involve
pointing. In many such gestureless cases, the authors appeal to discourse relations to
fix the semantic values of demonstrative expressions. However, even if we grant that
discourse relations might sometimes have a role to play in resolving questions of refer-
ence, as far as we can tell, extra-linguistic context still ends up doing the heavy lifting.
This comes out particularly clearly in connection with the most prominent example
of deixis without pointing from Stojnic´ et al. (2013).
In that example, (9) is uttered by someone watching a cooking show in which an
omelet is being fried in a pan:
(9) That’s an omelet.
Intuitively, the omelet in question should turn out to be the referent of the demonstra-
tive. But here, as Stojnic´ et al. set up the case, there is no pointing gesture. This means
that the strategy we considered earlier, of using a π update to make a certain object
prominent (and thus available to serve as an antecedent for ‘@’) will not work.
Instead of π , then, it might seem more promising for Stojnic´ et al. to appeal to
their σ update, which requires no accompanying demonstration. On this strategy, they
might offer an LF along the following lines:
(10) 〈σ0s0〉; [is.an.omelet(@)]
On the face of things, this LF seems like it should do the right sort of work. Recall
that the σ operation puts the central individual from situation s0 into the 0-slot of
the sequence representing the linguistic context. Supposing that the central individual
from s0 is an omelet, this maneuver will deliver the intuitive truth conditions for an
utterance of (9).
The maneuver, however, raises the following question: what makes the omelet the
‘central individual’ in s0 (which might be interpreted as, inter alia, the speech situation,
the scene viewed on the television, or the scene that is at issue in some conversation)?
As we noted earlier, Stojnic´ et al. never offer a straightforward answer to this question.
Some obvious possibilities might include the omelet’s being maximally salient or being
at the center of the speaker’s attention. But neither of these options will do for them,
since both rely on an obvious appeal to the extra-linguistic context.
Is there another avenue by which Stojnic´ et al. might secure the referent for the
demonstrative from (9)? Given how prominently their theory features discourse rela-
tions, a piece of theoretical machinery they frequently use to mimic the kind of work
gestures do,23 and given the fact that the formalizations they apply in cases of deixis
without pointing all feature discourse relations, it would be natural to think that such
23 In their (2017) at p. 539, for example, the authors claim that the Elaboration relation systematically puts
the direct object of a sentence into the top spot in the attention register. Other relations, like Narrative, put
the subject of the sentence into that spot instead. Such discourse relations serve to make certain objects
prominent (in the sense of prominence their theory is based on), and thus available to serve as antecedents
for demonstratives. A sentence that encodes one of these relations will constrain the possible interpretations
of anaphora in sentences to follow, without leaving any role to be played by the extra-linguistic context.
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relations must do substantial work in determining the referents of demonstratives in
examples like (9).
Crucially, however, the particular discourse relation Stojnic´ et al. apply to the
paradigmatic omelet case is not one that updates the attentional register. To analyze
(9), Stojnic´ et al. (2013, p. 518) offer the following LF:
(11) 〈α0〉; [Summary(s0, e0)]; 〈σ1s0〉; 〈π1@that〉; [omelet(e0, x1)]24
This LF is substantially more complicated than any we have considered so far. This is
because above, we presented LFs in terms of the formalism of Stojnic´ et al. (2017),
which simplifies the system from Stojnic´ et al. (2013) in several respects. Since the
fullest explanation Stojnic´ et al. offer of deixis without pointing is in their (2013),
however, we turn here to the full complexity of that system in order to see whether it
can offer an answer to our question about reference.
In the 2013 system, Stojnic´ et al. assume that predicates like being an omelet pick
out relations between events (or, more technically, and following Kratzer 2002, even-
tualities) and objects, locations, etc.25 Discourse relations pick out relations between
events, in this case s0 and e0. Some discourse relations update the attention register in
various ways, while others leave the register unchanged, imposing other semantic or
pragmatic constraints on the discourse.26
The contribution made by the discourse relation Stojnic´ et al. offer in (11), Summary,
is characterized by them as follows:
Semantically, e0 must be part of s0. Following Kratzer (2002), this entails that
the information in the accompanying sentence, which is fleshed out in terms
of constraints on e0, all winds up true in s0. Pragmatically, Summary(s0, e0)
holds only if the information the speaker uses to characterize e0 provides a good
answer about “what’s happening” in s0. (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, p. 517)
Whatever claim Summary might have to being an important element of our theoretical
toolkit, it clearly does not provide an answer to the question of why one omelet, as
opposed to some other, or as opposed to any other thing at all, should end up counting
as the referent of the demonstrative from (9) when the sentence is used on a particular
occasion.27
If gestures do not fix the referent of our demonstrative, however, and if Summary
doesn’t either, then what does? We suspect that Stojnic´ et al. will say: ‘The linguistic
context by itself. When there is no pointing, and when discourse relations do not shape
the attention register, then a demonstrative will just pick out whichever individual is in
the top slot of the context transpose.’28 By our lights, however, this is an unsatisfying
24 So far as we can tell, this LF involves a redundant π -update; we will essentially ignore that update in
our discussion below.
25 This is why the predicate omelet takes both a situation, e0, and an individual, x1 as arguments.
26 Compare note 23 above.
27 In personal communication, Stojnic´ et al. have expressed agreement with us on this point; Summary,
they say, is not meant to play a reference-fixing role. We are not sure what to make of their claim that
‘[I]t is the effect of a Summary that the central entity of a situation the summary is about is rendered most
prominent.’ (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, p. 518)
28 In the Stojnic´ et al. (2013) formalism, this will be the 1-slot, as the 0-slot is occupied by an event.
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answer. We see no clear way of determining which individual will be in the top slot
of any particular linguistic context updated as per (11). Nearly any Heim context will
support any number of different possible summaries, each with a different object at
the center.
To bring this problem into even sharper relief, notice that the first operation specified
in (11) is 〈α0〉. This operation works roughly like a Heim-style indefinite: it puts an
‘unspecified entity’, e0, into the 0-slot of the attention register.29 Summary requires
that this event be a part of a broader event, s0, and that it in some sense provide a
summary thereof.
But what events, exactly, should count as s0 and e0? At first glance, it might seem like
different answers to this question will provide different referents for the demonstrative
from (9). If that demonstrative ends up picking out the central individual from e0, then
treating different events as e0 will yield different objects as the referent; the center of
my omelet cooking is one omelet, and the center of your omelet cooking is another.
So how, when we set about evaluating a particular utterance, should we know which
situation to treat as s0, and which as e0?
In point of fact, Stojnic´ et al. have a way of dodging this question. Recall that,
on their analysis of (9), namely (11), each instance of s0 and e0 is embedded under
the existential quantifier associated with α. So in the context of this LF, s0 and e0
are not names for particular situations; rather, s0 and e0 are variables that range over
events.30 If an utterance of (9) expresses the LF given in (11), then it will be true with
regard to any variable assignment that maps s0 and e0 to a pair of events in which
the second summarizes the first and in which the central object in the second event
is an omelet. So, on this analysis, demonstrative sentences like ‘that is F’ which are
not accompanied by a gesture turn out to have the form of existentially quantified
sentences: they will be true with regard to every assignment that returns a pair of
events such that the second is a summary of the first and which is such that the central
object of the second is an F.
This audacious proposal reminds us of Russell (1905)’s line with regard to proper
names. Stojnic´ et al. ‘solve’ the problem of having to pair a Kaplan context up with the
referent of a demonstrative by saying that demonstratives, when unaccompanied by
gestures, do not in fact refer. To repeat: deixis without pointing, according to Stojnic´
et al., does not involve reference. Rather, non-gestural deictic sentences, like (9), are
to be understood as truth conditionally equivalent to rather complicated descriptive
sentences.
As with Russell’s theory, this theory not only counterintuitively claims that a certain
class of intuitively referential terms does not really involve reference at all, it also runs
into trouble where folk intuitions about truth conditions are concerned. Suppose you
utter (9) while we are watching Julia Child cook an omelet on TV. We would contend
that you have said something true. The theory described by Stojnic´ et al. correctly
predicts this. On that theory, your utterance is analyzed using (11), and since there
29 This is why, in the Stojnic´ et al. (2013) formalism, the top-ranked individual in an attentional context
must occupy not the 0-slot, but the 1-slot; otherwise we would lose track of the relevant event.
30 Stojnic´ et al. (p.c.) confirm that this was their intended reading of the sentence, and that the point of
adding the existential quantifier to the front of the LF was indeed to avoid the sort of worry raised in the
last paragraph.
123
E. Nowak, E. Michaelson
is a pair of situations that meets the constraints that LF imposes, the theory predicts
that you have said something true. Now suppose, however, that we are standing on
the street and there are no omelets anywhere nearby. You say (9). Intuitively, you say
something false or otherwise defective. But, on the theory described by Stojnic´ et al.,
this is not the result we get. Somewhere in the universe there is almost certainly a pair
of events such that one summarizes the other and has an omelet at its center. So, their
account is very likely to predict that you have said something true.
This strikes us as an unacceptable result. We take it to be a minimum condition
on the adequacy of any story about demonstratives that it make what you say in the
case just described false. In order to get that result out of Stojnic´ et al.’s theory, we
would need a way to rule out all of the possible evaluations of (9) that involve pairs
of omelet-involving situations that are nowhere near the place and time of the speech
act in question. We see no way of pulling off that trick without invoking the place and
time of the speech act. Regardless of whether you build domain restriction into the
quantifier associated with the α operation or limit peoples’ judgments about truth to
some subset of the model, all of the available avenues would appear to run through
the Kaplan context.
The proposal Stojnic´ et al. offer also seems to conflict with their own claim that
utterances of sentences like (9) are ‘situated utterances’ (Stojnic´ et al. 2013, pp. 502,
505, 517–518). Informally, they often write as though there is a relevant situation for
the evaluation of the utterance: either the one in which the speech act occurs or else
one which is somehow made clear by that speech act, as when we are trying to interpret
a sentence uttered on television. But we can see no way of squaring this claim with
the LF that Stojnic´ et al. propose to associate with utterances like (9). The problem
is that this LF embeds s0 under what is effectively an existential quantifier—since
it is anaphorically linked to e0, which is explicitly quantified over, via the Summary
relation—meaning that there is no way for it to be matched to any one situation in
particular. In other words, there is no sense in which the LF reflects the ‘situated-ness’
of the utterance.
Of course, Stojnic´ et al. could modify their proposed LF, dropping the quantifier and
treating terms like so as meta-language names for particular events. But we fail to see
how that would amount to anything other than a concession that the truth conditions
associated with a sentence like (9) depend on the extra-linguistic context in which (9)
is uttered or evaluated. That, however, is precisely the sort of view that Stojnic´ et al.
promised to break with—for this is just to admit that the meanings of demonstratives
are context-sensitive in exactly the way that philosophers have long taken them to
be.31
To underscore the strangeness of Stojnic´ et al.’s proposal, consider a case in which
two omelets are being prepared side-by-side. One is a vegetarian omelet, the other
31 If all that Stojnic´ et al. mean by claiming that demonstratives are not sensitive to context is that no element
corresponding to the contribution made by the demonstrative to the LF associated with a demonstrative
sentence is sensitive to permutations of the context parameter, then their original claim becomes significantly
less striking. Indeed, as we understand the state of play in the literature, this is now a very prominent view,
if not the standard one: context resolution takes place not in the semantics, on many leading views, but in
the post-semantics. Stojnic´ et al.’s proposal, on this reading, would differ in locating the effects of context
in the pre-semantics instead, but this would not be the radical revision we took the authors to have been
advancing.
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filled with ham. Imagine that a vegetarian speaker says to her listener, who knows that
she is a vegetarian:
(12) That’s a lovely-looking omelet.
We take it that it will be extremely natural for the listener to take the speaker to
be talking about the vegetarian omelet—though, obviously, there are situations in
which that might be overridden. Absent a gesture from the speaker, however, there
is no way for Stojnic´ et al. to explain that natural interpretation in terms of the LF
to be associated with (12). The problem isn’t that the relevant LF will associate the
demonstrative here with some other referent. Rather, the problem is that, on Stojnic´ et
al.’s reading, the LF associated with (12) is purely quantificational, and lacking in any
referential properties at all. So any natural interpretation of the utterance will actually
amount to a misunderstanding of its logical form.
We have focused here on the most prominent example of deixis without pointing
from Stojnic´ et al. (2013). But lest the reader think that our focus has been somehow
uncharitable, let us consider another of their examples. Imagine that someone utters
the following sentence while standing in front of a telescope that is aimed at Jupiter:
(13) That is Jupiter.
Stojnic´ et al. want their theory to associate the following update with (13):
(14) 〈α0〉; [Summary(s0, e0)]; 〈σ1s0〉; 〈π1@that〉; [ jupi ter(e0, x1)]
What’s being summarized here, according to Stojnic´ et al. (2013), is ‘a scene viewed
through the telescope’ (p. 519).32 So the truth or falsehood of (13) will depend on
whether there is a pair of events, one of which summarizes the other and has Jupiter as
its central object. For the purpose of considering this example, we are going to assume
that Stojnic´ et al. can offer us some story about how the domain of quantification for α
is to be restricted to scenes viewed through the telescope present in the actual speech
situation. Even granting this, we find the proposed analysis problematic in several
ways.
First of all, we think it is important to stress that, as a matter of empirical fact, it will
only very rarely be the case that people who look through telescopes, microscopes,
and similar devices converge on the same object. Learning to identify objects in a
microscope takes significant practice, and except where the most powerful telescopes
and the most obvious targets are involved, the most common refrain at astronomy
demonstrations is ‘what am I supposed to be looking at here?’33 In other words, we
reject the thought that it is appropriate to treat notions like ‘whatever is centrally
imaged by a telescope’ as basic in a theory that aims to answer questions like: under
what conditions are utterances of sentences like (13) true or false? Not only are we
32 We leave aside the question of whether a scene can legitimately count as an event (or even an ‘eventative’).
Clearly, one can construct a corresponding event easily enough: an event of someone’s looking through the
telescope. We take it that this must be what Stojnic´ et al. have in mind.
33 There has, in fact, been a great deal of work in the philosophy of science aimed at trying to understand
how it is that we see through these sorts of devices. No one, to the best of our knowledge, takes things to
be nearly so simple as Stojnic´ et al. assume. For a helpful discussion of the sorts of issues that arise with
respect to microscopes, for instance, see Hacking (1981).
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skeptical that there is a well-behaved property of being what is centrally imaged in a
telescope, a theory like Stojnic´ et al.’s holds our overall understanding of what makes
an utterance like (13) true or false hostage to our understanding of this property. This
hardly strikes us as a desirable feature for a theory of demonstratives.
To illustrate the point, imagine a fuller description of the situation described above:
one that specifies that, in addition to Jupiter’s being visible in the telescope, Ganyme-
de, its largest moon, is visible as well. However, suppose that, although Ganymede is
visible, it is mostly occluded—such that only an expert astronomer would be able to
recognize that it is visible at all. In this case, we can imagine such an expert uttering
either (13) or (15):
(13) That is Jupiter.
(15) That is Ganymede, Jupiter’s largest moon.
Either utterance seems perfectly acceptable to us. Now, for Stojnic´ et al. to successfully
predict this, it looks like they’ll need to accept that Ganymede can count as being
centrally imaged in the telescope in this situation. Since they don’t want to appeal to
extra-linguistic context beyond the event of the imaging, we take it that it should not
matter who is uttering (15). Regardless of this, there is an event that summarizes the
scene viewed through the telescope with Ganymede at its center.
We find this prediction implausible. To our ear, when (15) is uttered by a novice who
would be unable to look through the telescope and identify Ganymede, the utterance
is at the very least infelicitous. Of course, we don’t mean to commit ourselves to
anything like the claim that, for demonstratives to refer, the speaker must be occurrently
perceiving her intended referent. We do, however, think that there is likely to be some
potentially complex relationship between the discriminatory capacities of the speaker
and the objects that we take her to be capable of referring to with demonstratives.
Whatever this relationship is, the speaker—and hence the extra-linguistic context—
looks to be an essential part of it.
Even if we set these worries aside for the sake of argument, we again see no way
to make Stojnic´ et al.’s picture work without invoking the extra-linguistic context.
Imagine a case in which the view through a nearby telescope is of a large, uniform,
white circle against an undifferentiated black background. Is an utterance of (13) true
or false in this context? Well, that presumably depends on what the telescope is actually
imaging. The scene through the telescope might appear identical to any desired level
of detail with the telescope either imaging Jupiter or a cleverly illuminated sheet of
paper that happens (randomly) to have marks on it that look identical to Jupiter’s
surface, up to any desired level of detail. Intuitively, (13) is true in the first case but
false in the second. But since the scene is visually indiscriminable in both cases, it
would seem that truth and falsity must depend on the scene’s relational properties. As
best we can tell, that’s just to say that the truth or falsity of (13) depends here on the
extra-linguistic context.
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4 Conclusion
In this essay we have argued that, while it is indeed possible to offer a semantic picture
that exchanges the challenge of explaining indexicality or assignment-sensitivity for
the challenge of explaining disambiguation, this by no means eliminates appeals to
extra-linguistic context. On the contrary, even in their brief remarks on the nature
of disambiguation, Stojnic´ et al. routinely appeal to extra-linguistic context. Absent
further argument, we cannot see how moving appeals to extra-linguistic context into
the ‘pre-semantics’ of one’s theory constitutes a real step forward in our understanding
of the meanings of terms like pronouns and demonstratives.
Instead, we are inclined to think that, in trading questions like ‘On what does the
reference or value of a use of e.g. a demonstrative depend?’ or ‘On what does the truth
or falsity of a demonstrative sentence depend?’ for the question ‘What determines
which of any number of unpronounced items should be used to represent the meaning
of a demonstrative sentence at the level of logical form?’ we may have taken a step
backwards in terms of the clarity of our inquiry. Moreover, we suspect that, if one could
answer either of these first two questions in a satisfying way, it would be possible to
implement the resulting theory, formally, at the level of pre-semantics, semantics, or
metasemantics—however one might be inclined by other sorts of background consid-
erations.
This does not mean that nothing is at stake in deciding whether, semantically speak-
ing, demonstratives are highly ambiguous, as Stojnic´ et al. propose, or whether their
meaning can be captured by a unified character, or whether they should be represented
simply using free variables. In fact, we think that quite a lot is at stake here. For
instance, one might think that Grice (1989)’s dictum that we should not multiply lin-
guistic items beyond necessity is very much at issue.34 Equally, one might worry that
the sorts of languages described by Stojnic´ et al. might be unlearnable for finite beings
like ourselves. We doubt that either of these issues will prove at all straightforward,
and we have no ambitions of trying to settle either here.
Although this essay has been mostly critical, we would like to close on a constructive
note. Although we disagree with the details of the position Stojnic´ et al. describe, we
are sympathetic to the thought that it may well be a mistake to appeal to extra-linguistic
context in order to fix the reference of demonstratives. Both of us come from the West
Coast tradition of semantics—a tradition which has long been associated with the quest
to locate the one true metasemantics for demonstratives—but we increasingly find
ourselves worrying that recent theories about how context determines demonstrative
reference have become implausibly baroque. Perhaps, like us, Stojnic´ et al. have been
moved by the niggling sense that there has to be a better way forward.
Consider a recent example from King (2013), who is modifying an earlier proposal
in response to a bevy of arguments later to appear in Speaks (2016):35
34 We are ourselves unsure what the force of this ‘should’ this is supposed to be. At the end of the day, our
best guess would be that this should be understood as an aesthetic principle.
35 Even more confusingly, the earlier proposal appears in King (2014b), which finally went to press only
after it had already been supplanted.
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A speaker S’s use δ of a demonstrative expression in context c has o as its
semantic value iff 1. o is the object of S’s controlling intention in using δ in
c; and 2. a competent, reasonable, attentive hearer H who knows the common
ground of the conversation at the time S utters δ, and who has the properties
attributed to the audience by the common ground at the time S utters δ would
recognize that o is the object of S’s controlling intention in using δ in c in the
way S intends H to recognize her intention. (King 2013, pp. 300–301)
The notion of a ‘controlling intention’ here is a highly technical one, one which depends
on understanding intentions on the model of plans (cf. Bratman 1987) and positing,
further, that those plans are to be individuated hyperintentionally. Basically, reference
to o succeeds if the speaker intends for her listener to identify o, specified de dicto,
as her intended referent—and so long as a suitably-idealized version of the listener
would in fact identify, via this very same dictum, this object as the speaker’s intended
referent. Otherwise, reference fails.
We have no desire to argue against the specifics of King’s proposal here.36 Rather,
we want merely to suggest that, when faced with a proposal like this one, one reason-
able reaction might well be to ask whether we should return to our starting assumptions
to see whether we took a wrong turn somewhere. Stojnic´ et al. suggest that we went
wrong in appealing to extra-linguistic context to determine the reference of demonstra-
tives. Instead, we should appeal only to linguistic conventions. We take our arguments
to have been directed against the second of these suggestions, not the first. Here is an
alternative which is also compatible with the first: reject the claim that sentences con-
taining demonstratives have canonical truth conditions, strictly speaking. Instead, we
might suppose that demonstratives serve as something like place-holders—unassigned
variables, if you like—which get assigned to a values only when we focus in on some
more specific questions about the relevant speech act.37 Standard questions might
include: what was the speaker trying to communicate? What would a reasonable lis-
tener have likely recovered in these circumstances? And how might we, as external
observers knowing all the relevant facts, settle a bet on the truth or falsity of the
utterance? While the answers to these questions will themselves require appeals to
extra-linguistic context, those appeals will plausibly turn out to be more straightfor-
ward and direct than when we try to ask about reference simpliciter.
Our aim here is not to defend this suggestion.38 Rather, what we hope to have
clarified is that, if one is motivated to try to avoid appealing to the extra-linguistic
context to determine the reference of a demonstrative, that may indeed prove possible.
We have argued that it is not made possible, in any deep sense at least, by appeal-
ing to linguistic conventions. But one can also give up this assumption by rejecting
the uniqueness presupposition that has driven so much of our inquiry into the nature
36 See, however, Michaelson (2013), Nowak (forthcoming), and Nowak and Michaelson (2019a, b) for
such arguments.
37 This suggestion is, in fact, compatible with Stojnic´ et al.’s semantics with only minor modifications.
What we would need is to modify the update functions so as to add variables to the top position(s) in the
input context. So, for example, 〈π0U-notch〉 would become 〈π0x1〉. In keeping with the present proposal,
the assignment of x1 will depend on what question we are asking.
38 For a defense of the thesis, see Nowak (forthcoming), and Nowak and Michaelson (2019a).
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of reference. Rather than offering a theory of how the reference of a demonstrative
depends on certain aspects of the extra-linguistic context, one can aspire to offer a the-
ory of how the sort of reference relevant to understanding successful communication
or a listener’s expected reactions or betting behavior or judgments of sincerity might
depend on extra-linguistic context. And then one can hope to to start to map out what
relationships there might be, if any, between these different types of reference.
Given the sorts of theories to which this traditional assumption has led us, we think
that it is worth at least considering this sort of alternative. Not the superficial alternative
of exchanging context-sensitivity for ambiguity, but the more radical alternative of
embracing truth conditional indeterminacy as a more substantial fact of our linguistic
lives than we might previously have thought.39
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